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About this Policy Brief
This policy brief details recent economic developments 
in four of Asia’s largest economies - Japan, India, China 
and Indonesia - and assesses the implications of these 
changes for Australia. Jenny Corbett looks at how economic 
frustrations led to political change in Japan and argues that, 
despite this year’s devastating earthquake and tsunami, 
there is opportunity for continued economic growth if the 
Japanese government, in conjunction with industry, pursues 
a program of smart rebuilding and does not become mired 
in prolonged political disagreement. Raghbendra Jha looks 
at how structural changes in the Indian economy, along with 
changes in Indian society, have increased the rate of growth 
in the world’s second largest country. He argues that while 
trade and investment relations between Australia and India 
are strong, there is substantial room for improvement. He 
highlights infrastructure and the services sector as potential 
expansion areas. Ligang Song sees continued benefits to 
Australia from China’s ongoing growth in the third part 
of this policy brief. This rapid growth, however, will bring 
macroeconomic, environmental, and social challenges in 
China that can only be overcome through major structural 
reforms. Finally, Ross McLeod examines the issues confronting 
Indonesia’s economy, including high inflation, corruption 
and wasteful energy use. He argues that while these present 
significant challenges, Indonesia’s economy is still performing 
strongly, being one of the few countries not to have suffered 
a severe decline in growth as a result of the Global Financial 
Crisis.  
Previous Policy Briefs are available online:
http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/research/papers
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 The rhetoric of Japan’s “lost decades” is misleading. 
It creates an image of economic stasis over 20 years, 
which is far from the truth. Growth performance has 
been mixed but not without success. From 2001 to 
2007 Japan experienced the longest period of economic 
expansion since WWII. In 2005 it was the fastest growing 
OECD economy and that growth was underpinned by 
domestic investment and strengthened corporate and 
banking performance. R & D expenditures were higher 
than in Germany, the US or France.  Government fiscal 
balances were improving and deflation had ended. The 
global financial crisis derailed this performance but 
only briefly, and domestic financial structures proved 
resilient. By 2010 industrial production bounced back and 
GNP grew at 2.5 – 3.0% as an export-led recovery was 
boosted by stronger-than-anticipated recovery in Western 
advanced economies and rising capital goods demand 
in China. At the start of 2011 consensus forecasts were 
around 1.5% GDP growth for the year ahead, reflecting 
the dampening effect of the stronger yen and slower 
growth elsewhere. By most estimates the output gap was 
still significant so the economy was underperforming 
relative to potential but not in absolute terms. 
 
 Even before the March 11 earthquake important 
political changes had reflected voter frustration with 
policy failures in dealing with ongoing structural 
economic problems. In August 2009 the opposition 
party DPJ won a majority in the upper House and 
ousted the long-standing LDP government. A lack of 
confidence in government economic policy, weariness 
with vacillating and ineffective decision-making and 
a growing sense that structural reform produced 
regional and inter-generational inequality rather than 
the promised regeneration, played a key role. The new 
government initially promised a focus on consumers 
rather than producers and employment rather than fiscal 
rectitude but as one prime minister replaced another there 
appeared to be no strategy to deal with the continuing 
problems of declining population, growing government 
debt and an ever-rising yen. The Cabinet, under current 
Prime Minister Naoto Kan, approved a ‘New Strategy 
for Economic Growth’ in June 2010 with the goal of 3% 
real economic growth, overcoming deflation, and a 3% 
unemployment rate. There was a strong emphasis on 
restoring public finances with promises to cut the ratio 
of primary budget deficit to nominal GDP by half from 
6.4% in FY 2010 to 3.2% in FY2015 and reduce the primary 
budget deficit to zero in FY2020. After the DPJ loss in the 
Upper House election of October 2010 there was more 
focus on stimulus than on public finances.  
To restore growth in the face of declining labour 
supply and lacklustre productivity growth, even a 
dysfunctional government could see that structural 
reform, harnessing trade liberalization to drive it, would 
be crucial.  So the key elements of the growth strategy 
before the earthquake were accelerating EPAs/FTAs, 
strengthening environmental technology, and boosting 
tourism to stimulate the economy. The major policy 
debates before the earthquake were whether Japan 
should join the currently most promising trade liberalizing 
negotiations in the Asia-Pacific region, the TPP, and how 
to shift the opposition from the agriculture lobby by 
packaging liberalization with income support and safety 
nets for farmers. Policy announcements on both these 
have been promised for June but that timetable is now 
unlikely. This may mean a missed opportunity to combine 
METI’s new Industrial Strucutre Vision with a focus on 
improving services sector productivity, reducing reliance 
on manufacturing and re-energising the structural change 
agenda.  
The effect of the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear 
disaster on these longer-term structural questions is 
unpredictable. The short-term effects on GDP growth 
could be overcome within a year if normal patterns prevail 
but the uncertainty over power supplies and the future 
of the nuclear industry make this much more difficult 
to foresee. If smart  rebuilding contributes to relocation 
of manufacturing, further integration into production-
network trade patterns in neighbouring Asia, more flexible 
agriculture and a modernised services economy the 
prospects for a return to growth are brighter. If it results 
in prolonged political squabbles and a desire to recreate 
what was lost the prospects are less good. a modernised 
services economy the prospects for a return to growth 
are brighter. If it results in prolonged political squabbles 
and a desire to recreate what was lost the prospects are 
less good.  
Japan
Jenny Corbett
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India
Raghbendra Jha
 In 2010 India’s GDP in PPP terms was $3.92 trillion.  By 
this reckoning India was the fourth largest economy in 
the world after the US, China and Japan. Citi Investment 
Research and Analysis estimates that in a decade India 
will be the third largest economy. Between 2000-01 and 
2007-08 India’s real GDP growth averaged 7.3 per cent 
per annum. Growth rates have recently been around 9 
per cent and, sometimes in excess of 9 per cent except 
for the period since 2008-09. In that year GDP growth 
fell to 6.7 per cent in the face of the GFC. GDP growth 
rate picked up the very next year when it was 8 per cent. 
In 2010-11 real GDP growth is estimated to be 8.6 per 
cent and in 2011-12 is estimated to return to 9 per cent. 
With a population growth rate of about 1.7 per cent per 
annum (according to the latest Census of India (2011)) 
real GDP growth per capita has been in excess of 7 per 
cent per annum for several years. At this rate real GDP 
per capita will double in about 10 years. Since the 1970s 
average decadal growth rates have gone up even as the 
standard deviation of year to year growth has gone down 
(Figure 1).
The structure of India’s GDP has undergone immense 
transformation in the face of such rapid economic growth 
and has in, turn, contributed to it. During the decade 
1961-70 agricultural value added as a percentage of 
GDP was 42.5 per cent. Corresponding magnitudes for 
industry, manufacturing and services were, respectively, 
20.3 per cent, 14.3 per cent and 37.2 per cent. In 2008 
agriculture contributed 17.6 per cent of GDP whereas the 
contributions of industry, manufacturing, and services 
were respectively 29 per cent, 16 per cent and 53.4 per 
cent, respectively. This is an indicator both of India’s 
potential for further economic growth as well as that 
of a fundamental problem facing the Indian economy 
– how does one sector (agriculture) that contributes 
less than 18 per cent of GDP support more than 60 
per cent of India’s population? Within manufacturing 
India has increasingly specialised in higher value added 
manufacturing. In a growth accounting sense capital, 
labour and productivity growth have all contributed to 
enhanced rates of economic growth in India. Savings rates 
have risen to about 34 per cent and investment to about 
36 per cent, particularly since the 1990s, from very low 
levels in earlier decades.
Figure 1 Average decadal growth rates and standard deviations of year to year 
Source: Reserve Bank of India: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy
CRAWFORD SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND GOVERNMENT    3 
Asia’s Economic Transformation
  There is a very strong “demographic dividend” as the 
median age of the Indian population hovers around 25, 
indicating that India is home to more than 600 million 
people below the age of 25. Further, this labor force is 
becoming better trained (literacy rates have risen to 74 
per cent in the 2011 census). There is evidence that Total 
Factor Productivity in the production of aggregate GDP, 
and in the Manufacturing and Services Sector have each 
gone up, particularly post 1994. Agricultural productivity 
has not grown very fast. Openness to trade and investment 
went up sharply, particularly during the period 2002-07. 
Even after the GFC India continued its policy of trade 
liberalisation, with average manufacturing sector tariffs 
now down to 12 per cent or less.
 All these factors imply that economic growth rates in 
India will stay high and, given the increasing demographic 
dividend, may even accelerate. High rates of economic 
growth in India imply that there has been substantial 
poverty reduction.  But the elasticity of poverty reduction 
with respect to economic growth is lower in India than in 
many Asian countries, essentially because of the structure 
of economic growth. This implies that inequality has 
increased, but is still well below that of many emerging 
economies.
 Australia-India trade and investment relations are 
strong but well below potential. Bi-directional trade is 
heavily in favour of Australia. Australian exports to India 
are mainly in the resource area and there are some service 
exports. Indian exports to Australia are largely in the 
areas of Information Technology, pearls and gems, some 
electronic equipment and some service imports. FDI in 
each direction was around A$3 billion in 2008-09.
There is substantial room for expansion of both trade 
and investment. India is expected to invest more than 
US $1 trillion in infrastructure in the near future. There 
is substantial room for Australian investment and 
expertise in this area. Other areas of possible economic 
collaboration include food processing, educational 
institutions in India and the use of service sector expertise 
to enhance manufacturing sector growth, an area in 
which India has done very well. Australia could benefit 
from India’s expertise in this area. The Indian economy 
is likely to be a very strong engine for economic growth 
not just in the region, but globally as well.
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China
Ligang Song
 China’s economic transformation since the late 1970s 
is now recognised as one of the most significant social 
changes in human history. Within just three decades, China 
has transformed itself from a centrally-planned, closed 
economy to a market-oriented open economy, delivering 
rapid and sustained economic growth along the way. The 
dynamics unleashed by the reform, open policies and 
institutional changes included enormous entrepreneurial 
energy and continuous capital accumulation, labour 
migration, productivity gains, trade and income growth on 
a scale that the world has never seen before. The Chinese 
economy grew at an average rate of over 9 per cent per 
annum over the period 1978-2010. China’s total GDP, 
industrial output, foreign trade, and importantly its per 
capita income increased in real terms by factors of 16, 27, 
124 and 12 respectively over this period. As a result, the 
incidence, depth and severity of poverty have declined 
dramatically. China is now the second largest economy in 
the world with its GDP accounting for about 10 per cent 
of the world total.
 China is entering a new period in which its pattern of 
growth will be dictated not only by those fundamental 
forces that have been working in the past, but by the 
strategies that China has been compelled to adopt at 
this stage of its development. China’s rapid growth brings 
about significant macroeconomic, environmental, and 
social challenges that have their origin in its pattern of 
growth as well as in the changing internal and external 
environment in which growth takes place. The major 
problems China faces both internally and externally, 
now and in the foreseeable future, are structural in 
nature. At the core are two main tasks of rebalancing 
the economic structure both internally and externally, 
and sustaining long-term growth. The latter task consists 
of the imperatives of achieving low carbon as well as 
more equitable growth in the next phase of China’s 
industrialisation and development. A key for China 
is to alter its mode of economic growth from relying 
primarily on the inputs of factors of production to the 
improvement of productivity. To achieve the task, China’s 
key institutions need to be reformed to accommodate the 
rapid technological, structural, social and distributional 
changes. Maintaining a relatively open, multilateral 
political, trading and financial system provides an 
important institutional basis on which the required 
structural changes take place, the expansion of
international trade continues to be a positive-sum rather 
than a zero-sum game, and the global common goals such 
as financial integration, poverty reduction, climate change 
and regional and international security can be achieved 
with success. China is expected to play a more important 
role in reforming and strengthening such a system.
To reflect the adjustment in its growth strategy, China 
has set a relatively low growth target of 7 per cent per 
annum in the 12th Five-Year plan (2011-2015). Other key 
targets for this period include: increasing the urbanisation 
rate to 51.5 per cent (up by 4 percentage points), lifting 
the service sector’s share in GDP to 47 per cent (up by 4 
percentage points), creating 45 million new jobs in urban 
areas, increasing R&D expenditure in GDP to 2.2 per cent, 
and cutting energy consumption per unit of GDP by 16 
per cent and carbon emissions per unit of GDP by 17 
per cent. Australia will continue to benefit from these 
developments in China.
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Indonesia was one of very few countries not to suffer 
a severe decline in growth as a result of the Global 
Financial Crisis. Even at its lowest point in mid-2009 the 
GDP growth rate remained above 4% p.a., recovering 
to a surprisingly high 6.9% by the end of 2010 — with 
growth being driven primarily by investment spending, 
indicating a high level of business confidence. Inflation 
has been quite steady for the last six months at close to 
7% p.a., which is a little above the target range. This is 
a disappointing outcome rather than a major problem, 
and reflects the central bank’s reluctance to allow the 
rupiah to appreciate. In response to surging food prices 
the government has temporarily removed tariffs on rice, 
wheat and soybeans, and ordered increased rice imports. 
A severe fiscal problem has been apparent over the 
last several years — not in the usual form of unsustainable 
deficits, but as a consequence of enormous subsidies to 
the consumption of energy, both fuel and electricity. 
These ongoing subsidies do not threaten macroeconomic 
stability but, rather, encourage the wasteful use of 
energy, frittering away a large proportion of the value 
of Indonesia’s abundant hydrocarbon resources — oil, gas 
and coal. The main beneficiaries are the relatively wealthy 
classes, since they consume much more energy than the 
poor. Although the government is aware of the problem, 
its frequently professed intention to reduce the subsidies 
has been repeatedly postponed. Thus the national budget 
devotes many billions of dollars to energy subsidies 
instead of using these funds to create new infrastructure 
and to provide better and more extensive education and 
health services.
The composition of exports has altered quite 
dramatically over the last two decades, albeit in 
unanticipated directions. The high hopes that had earlier 
been held for labour-intensive exports such as textiles, 
clothing and footwear have not come to fruition. Rather, 
the expansion of exports has been dominated by coal 
and palm oil. The country shares of exports have also 
undergone significant change, reflecting the growing 
relative importance of Asia to the global economy. Exports 
to countries such as Malaysia, India and China have been 
expanding rapidly, while Indonesia’s older export markets 
— the US, Japan and Europe — are being steadily pushed 
to the background.
Indonesia’s banking system virtually collapsed in the 
late 1990s during the Asian Financial Crisis, at enormous 
cost to taxpayers. By contrast, it came through the Global 
Financial Crisis almost unscathed, except for the failure of 
a single, relatively small bank. This episode, which cost the 
government about $700 million, reminded policymakers 
of a forgotten decision of about 11 years ago to establish 
a single authority to supervise the entire financial sector. 
There were extensive discussions of a draft law along 
these lines in 2010, but as yet it has not been possible to 
resolve certain issues. This is fortunate, because the draft 
law, if enacted, would result in a wasteful and confusing 
duplication of the role of bank supervision in the planned 
new authority. In any case, there is little to suggest any 
clear understanding on the part of policymakers as to 
exactly what establishing the new authority is supposed 
to achieve. 
The current dynamism of the Indonesian economy 
would appear to spring mainly from the private, rather 
than the public, sector. There are frequent complaints 
about the government’s continuing failure to invest 
adequately in infrastructure, while proper management of 
public sector infrastructure has been largely overlooked. 
The president’s proposal for a new capital city as a solution 
to the horrendous shortcomings of Jakarta is unhelpful, 
because it avoids the fundamental question as to why 
Jakarta and other large cities perform their many and 
diverse functions so poorly. Well functioning cities are 
crucial to modernisation of the economy, and are also 
important for poverty reduction. City governments 
could greatly improve their performance by adopting a 
strategy of financial self-reliance: requiring the users of 
the services they provide to pay for them, rather than 
relying on central government handouts to cover costs. 
Thus far, however, there appears to be little support for 
such a strategy.
 Notwithstanding the president’s heavy emphasis on 
eliminating corruption, there is little concrete evidence 
to suggest that much progress has been made over the 
last six or seven years. The general public is becoming 
increasingly concerned about the gap between policy 
rhetoric and action in this field. A strong contributor to
Indonesia
Ross H McLeod
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this recently has been a long-running corruption saga 
involving a relatively junior tax official, whose activities 
have helped confirm the public’s worst fears about the 
ineffectiveness of the anti-corruption campaign. This case 
has made it clear not only that corruption still infects the 
ministry of finance, but also that it remains rampant in the 
courts, the police, the prison system and the immigration 
office. Claims of progress in this and other fields usually 
are typically grossly overstated, and opinion polls suggest 
that they have become unconvincing to voters. Genuine 
progress in minimising corruption is unlikely to occur 
in the absence of radical change in human resource 
management practices, including abandonment of 
promotion by seniority, opening up the public sector 
to recruitment from outside, and much more closely 
aligning public sector levels of remuneration with the 
private sector.
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